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CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION - DEALERS' CONTRACTS - Defendant
manufacturer, reserving the right to sell to enumerated persons, granted plaintiff
dealer a franchise to sell certain of defendant's products in a defined territory.
Plaintiff in turn promised to establish a place of business and develop the territory to the satisfaction of defendant. All orders received by defendant were to
be subject to acceptance by defendant; defendant agreed to fill accepted orders
as promptly as practicable; and plaintiff expressly released defendant from
liability for loss or damage arising from failure of defendant to fill the plaintiff's
orders. A clause, originally part of the agreement, allowing either party to cancel

1938]

RECENT DECISIONS

1 33

or terminate the agreement at any time, was later rescinded. After the agreement was thus amended, defendant repudiated it. In a suit for damages for
breach of contract the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
agreement lacked mutuality and was too indefinite to constitute a contract. Held,
judgment reversed. Defendant, having granted plaintiff an exclusive franchise,
impliedly undertook not to employ any other dealer in the territory. This was
itself consideration to support plaintiff's promises. Defendant also impliedly
promised to use an honest judgment in, passing upon orders submitted by
plaintiff, treating them equally with other orders received and weighing all orders against available supply. Jay Dreher Corp. v. Delco Appliance
Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 275.
A dealer's contract commonly involves a grant to the dealer of an exclusive
franchise for the sale of the manufacturer's product in a defined territory, and
an undertaking by the dealer to purchase a certain quantity of the product or
to establish a place of business and develop the territory to the satisfaction of the
manufacturer. The contract usually contains no promise by the manufacturer
to sell and deliver, and may expressly relieve him from liability for failing to
deliver. Frequently also it reserves to the manufacturer a right to cancel the
contract.1 Certain older cases have held such a contract void for want of "mutuality" because the manufacturer was released from liability for non-delivery. 2
The view represented in these cases seems to be that the undertaking, implicit
in the grant of an exclusive franchise by the manufacturer, not to employ any
other dealer in the territory is too profitless to the dealer to have been a bargaining factor; that, though such an undertaking involves a legal detriment to the
manufacturer, it is presumably not the agreed exchange for what is undertaken
by the dealer, therefore is not consideration. 3 Other cases, though not recogniz1 For a general discussion, see 31 CoL. L. REv. 830 (1931). Cases are listed
in 27 CoL. L. REv. 838 at 841 (1927).
2 Goodyear v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 159 App. Div. u6, 143 N. Y. S.
1046 (1913), noted 12 MICH. L. REv. 321 (1913), affd. 220 N. Y. 749, II6 N. E.
1047 (1917); Wood v. Glen Falls Automobile Co., 174 App. Div. 830, 161 N. Y. S.
808 (1916) (company shall not be liable for any failure of performance on its part,
when such failure shall be "due to fires, strikes, accidents, or any other cause whatsoever''); Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1912)
201 F. 499 (no order shall be binding upon the manufacturer unless accepted by him
at least 30 days prior to the date for delivery); Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
138 Ark. 534,212 S. W. 313 (1919). In Meade v. Poppenberg, 167 App. Div. 411
at 414, 153 N. Y. S. 182 (1915), the contract provided that if "by reason of fires,
strikes, or any other cause" the defendant should be unable to make deliveries as per
specifications, defendant should return the deposit to plaintiff and not be liable for
commissions or damages. The court said, "By said clause it was only agreed that defendant should be relieved in case he was 'unable to make deliveries.' This did not
mean that he could arbitrarily refuse to deliver, but clearly intended to cover only
those causes where by act of God or otherwise delivery was put beyond his power."
But see Gile v. Interstate Motor Car Co., 27 N. D. 108, 145 N. W. 732 (1914),
noted L. R. A. 1915B 109, 62 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 633 (1914); 12 MICH. L. REv.
677 (1914).
3 "I am unable to see that the appointment of plaintiff as defendant's agent cured
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ing the contract as valid from its inception, have construed it to be an offer to
enter into a l,lnilateral contract 4 or a series of bilateral contracts.5 The case of
Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., lnc.,6 took a far
more liberal view. 7 In that case it was held that the undertaking by the manuthe iack of mutuality, because the position of agent to sell automobiles was an empty
thing, unless backed up by an enforceable agreement on defendant's part to deliver such
automobiles as plaintiff might be able to sell." Goodyear v. Koehler Sporting Goods
Co., 159 App. Div. u6 at n7, 143 N. Y. S. 1046 (1917), affd. 220 N. Y. 749,
II6 N. E. 1047 (1917).
4
Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 185 N. C. 479, u7 N. E. 706, 32 A. L. R.
196 at 209 (1923). The original agreement provided for its cancellation by either
party upon 5 days written notice. Later, plaintiffs refused to incur the expense involved
in establishing agencies and working the territory unless assured that the agreement
would not be cancelled during the current year and that the cars ordered would be
delivered. Upon being assured of this, plaintiffs went ahead and performed. In an
action for breach of contract by the manufacturer's failure to deliver, it was held that
though the original agreement may not have been binding, the agreement as modified
by parol constituted an offer to enter into a unilateral contract. In establishing agencies
and working the territory, plaintiffs accepted the offer.
5 Buick Motor Co. v. Thompson, 138 Ga. 282, 75 S. E. 354 (1912). The court
found an implied promise to deliver, and construed the agreement as an offer to enter
into a series of bilateral contracts. The dealer accepted by sending orders.
6
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 29 F. (2d) 3.
7 The manufacturer promised not to sell any cars within a defined territory except
to the dealer, who in turn promised to buy 900 cars to be chosen between two specified
models, to sell no other make of cars anywhere, to set up shop, and to push sales. The
manufacturer reserved the right to cancel the contract for the violation of any of the
conditions, or in case of dissension within the dealer's organization, prejudicial to the
market. The contract further provided: "This contract is subject to change in price
or design on all models without further notice." The manufacturer repudiated the
agreement; whereupon the dealer sued for damages for breach of contract. It was held
that the dealer's promise to buy the 900 cars from several models without specifying
the model did not make the contract too indefinite to be enforced: "damages might
at least be measured by the least profitable to the maker of any models which the
dealer might choose." Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co.,
Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 29 F. (2d) 3 at 5. Contra: Oakland Motor Car Co. v.
Indiana Automobile Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) 201 F. 499; Nebraska Aircraft Corp.
v. Varney, (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) 282 F. 608. The Moon case also held that a right
reserved to the manufacturer to change price or design on all models without notice
did not make the contract too indefinite and that the right reserved to the manufacturer
to cancel the contract for the violation of any of its conditions, or in case of dissension
in the dealer's organization prejudicial to the market, did not destroy the consideration. Contra: Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) 262
F. II6.
In Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) 194
F. 324 at 328, where the manufacturer reserved the "right to return deposits and
cancel the contract, and a letter by them to the party of the second part shall have been
sufficient notice," it was held that the manufacturer could "arbitrarily, and without
assigning cause, cancel the contract'' and that this destroyed "mutuality." See also
Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) 201 F.
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facturer not to employ any other dealer in the territory was itself consideration
for the dealer's promises. The court, however, refused to find an implied promise
by the manufacturer to sell and deliver. The dealer's recovery was to be measured by the number of cars the manufacturer would in fact have delivered if
he had abided by the contract. 8 In the instant case the court continued in the
course it had set for itself in the Moon Motor Car case. Although the court
found an applied promise by the manufacturer to use an honest judgment in
passing upon orders submitted by plaintiff, treating them equally with other
orders received and weighing all orders against available supply, it preferred
to rest its decision upon the exclusiveness of the franchise.9 The dealer's recovery was to be measured by two factors, the extent of the dealer's orders and
499 at 501 (contract "may be cancelled for just cause by either party giving a 30
days written notice •..• Any violation of this contract by either party may be considered sufficient cause for terminating the same without the notice prescribed").
Reservation of a right to cancel for cause, or by written notice, or after a definite
period of time, or by returning a deposit, does not destroy the consideration. I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 105 (1936). See also Corbin, "The Effect of Options
on Consideration," 34 YALE L. J., 571 (1925); 31 CoL. L. REv. 830 (1931); Munro,
"The Necessity for 'Mutuality' and the Right of Termination in Sales Agencies," 28
ILL. L. REv. 800 (1934). In Ellis v. Dodge Bros. (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) 246 F. 764,
reversing (D. C. Ga. 1916) 237 F. 860, the court found an implied promise by the
manufacturer to sell and deliver, and held that the clause providing for cancellation
upon 15 days written notice did not destroy the consideration, since the contract
"would always be effective for at least the 15 days required for written notice.'' It
was concluded that though the manufacturer had had the right to cancel, he had
permitted the term of the contract to expire without exercising the right and was now
bound by his implied promise to sell and deliver. Cf. Wilson v. Studebaker Corp. of
America, (D. C. Pa. 1917) 240 F. 801; Gile v. Interstate Motor Car Co., 27 N. D.
108, 145 N. W. 732 (1914).
8 "Suppose that the dealer has promised to buy, and the maker has not promised
to sell. Nevertheless the dealer had his monopoly by virtue of which the maker must
sell to him if he would sell at all. • •• We cannot say that it was an impossible task
to show, with certainty enough to support a verdict, how many cars the maker would
in fact have delivered under pressure of this limitation, even though he was not legally
bound to deliver any at all." Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car
Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 29 F. (2d) 3 at 4.
Where the breach by the manufacturer consists in selling directly to consumers
in the dealer's territory, the dealer is allowed to recover the regular commissions on all
such sales made by the manufacturer. Schiffman v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 13 Cal.
App. 600, II0 P. 460 (1910); Sparks v. Reliable Dayton Motor Car Co., 85 Kan.
29, II6 P. 363, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1251 at 1252 (19u).
9 Defendant urged that the clause whereby the manufacturer was released from
liability for any loss or damage arising from failure to fill the dealer's orders gave him
the right to breach the contract with impunity and destroyed the consideration. It
was held that the purpose of this clause was to deprive the dealer of recourse over in
case the manufacturer defaulted after accepting the dealer's order, and thereby rendered the dealer liable on his corresponding engagements with customers; that it did
not release the manufacturer from liability on the contract generally. Jay Dreher
Corp. v. Delco Appliance Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 275.
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the extent to which the manufacturer, acting in good faith, would have filled
them. It is submitted that the earlier cases, holding the dealer's contract void
for want of "mutuality," 10 cannot be sustained. Since an exclusive franchise will
exert a pressure upon the manufacturer to deliver, in order to keep a market for
his product in the territory,11 and since it assures the dealer against the competition of other dealers whom the manufacturer would otherwise be free to employ
in the territory, it would seem that an exclusive franchise is something worth
bargaining for and is therefore of sufficient "value" to constitute a legal consideration.

Richard S. Brawerman

10 "It is often stated, as if it were a requisite in the formation of contracts, that
there must be mutuality. This form of statement is likely to cause confusion as however
limited it is at best an unnecessary way of stating that there must be valid consideration .
• . • The particular error which is traceable to this misleading use of the word 'mutuality'
as a requirement for the formation of contracts, is a tendency observable in some cases
to hold a contract invalid because the obligation undertaken on one side is not commensurate with that undertaken on the other." l WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,
§ 141 (1936).
11 "The maker had to keep up his metropolitan market, and would certainly do
his best to allocate his full stint to the dealer, through whom alone he could sell.••.
The absence of an express promise [ to deliver] probably indicated an unwillingness
to give more than the security arising from the monopoly." Moon Motor Car Co. of
New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 29 F. (2d) 3 at 4.

